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Abstract
Van Dijk et al describe how society’s influence on medicine drives both medicalisation and overdiagnosis, and allege 
that a major political and ethical concern regarding our increasingly interpreting the world through a biomedical 
lens is that it serves to individualise and depoliticize social problems. I argue that for medicalisation to serve this 
purpose, it would have to exclude the possibility of also considering problems in other (social or political) terms; 
but to think that medical descriptions of the world seek to or are able to do this is to misunderstand the purpose 
and function of model construction in science in general, and medicine in particular. So, if medicalisation is 
nonetheless used for the depoliticization described by many critics, we must ask what society does with medicine 
to give it this exclusive authority. I propose that the problem arises from a tendency to mistake the map for the 
territory, and think a tool to understand certain aspects of the world gives us the complete picture. To resist this 
process, I suggest health workers should be more open about the purpose and limitations of medicalisation, and 
the value of alternative descriptions of different aspects of human experience.
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Introduction
According to van Dijk et al, “what society does to medicine” 
is engage in a reciprocal relationship with healthcare and 
research institutions that drives both (over)medicalization 
and overdiagnosis.1 They emphasise one key function of this 
process; the individualization of social or political problems. 
But for medicalization or overdiagnosis to fulfil this role 
requires medicalized interpretations of phenomena to 
exclude other understandings; yet the way health workers and 
researchers employ biomedical knowledge is not exclusive 
in this fashion. Thus we must ask also “what society does 
with medicine” – exploring how the conceptual resources of 
medicine are appropriated and transformed to serve certain 
social functions.
I suggest that one important factor here is the inappropriate 
reification of biomedical models of human phenomena – the 
assumption that the medical descriptions of human experience 
“carve nature at the joints” and incorporate everything that 
can meaningfully be said about these experiences. This 
reification, I argue, mistakes the map for the territory – 
misunderstanding fundamentally the nature and purpose of 
model construction in healthcare (and science generally).
The Map and the Territory: Model Construction in Science 
and Medicine
Usually (though not invariably), to medicalize is to pathologise  
– to label some phenomenon a disorder. Overdiagnosis, 
too, concerns, what is called ‘disorder’ – since with many 
conditions (eg, chronic kidney disease or diabetes, or van Dijk 
et al’s preferred cases of dementia and learning disability),the 
definition of disorder involves drawing a sharp line in an 
otherwise fuzzy spectrum.2 But, as van Dijk et al correctly 
highlight, there is no uncontroversial definition of what it is 
for some condition to be a disorder or disease. Thus we must 
consider what medicalized descriptions of phenomena – the 
creation and application of a ‘biomedical model’ – seeks to do. 
And to achieve this requires understanding the meaning of 
model construction in the biological sciences.
A naive realism would hold that scientific descriptions of 
phenomena perfectly capture an underlying reality, and its 
categories – to borrow the Platonic metaphor – “carve nature 
at its joints.” But to insist that our scientific models adhere to 
this demanding standard is both to fail to describe actually 
existing scientific practice and to impose unwarranted 
limitations on the kinds of work scientific descriptions can 
perform. Throughout the natural sciences, useful and widely-
applied theories are full of entities and pictures that are 
fictional constructs. Some of them invoke concepts that do 
not demonstrably correspond to any particular entity in their 
domain of interest (eg, some thermodynamic potentials),while 
others make deliberate distortions to properties of the object 
of interest (modelling a pendant as an ideal pendulum, or 
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the world as mapped in the Mercator projection), or even 
(as with Bohr’s and Rutherford’s models of the atom) directly 
contradict the theories in which they are grounded.3 The way 
components of models are delineated and their interactions 
described has as much to do with the purposes for which a 
given phenomenon is being modelled, as with the nature of 
the phenomenon itself. These models have nonetheless served 
as central components of the image of the world presented 
by their respective sciences, because they usefully serve the 
purposes of scientific inquiry in their respective domains. 
Scientific modelling is a perspectival process4,5; it presupposes 
a vantage point from which we seek to situate phenomena in 
our understanding of the world, and depends upon the uses 
to which we seek to put that understanding.
There is good reason to think this is true also of our models of 
physiological and pathophysiological processes. At times, the 
same physiological systems are represented in contradictory 
ways for different purposes: in understanding blood pressure 
autoregulation – and the pathological states of hypo- and 
hypertension – blood flow is commonly treated as the laminar 
flow of an incompressible fluid through cylindrical pipes; 
but for other purposes such as modelling oedema, capillary 
permeability or fluid turbulence become more prominent. 
At other times systems are described at different levels in 
ways such that higher-level explanations can be realized by 
multiple lower-level systems and are not reducible to any 
number of these; the functional architecture of the brain as 
usually invoked in describing symptoms of stroke is neither 
reducible to nor uniquely explicable in terms of neuronal-
level networks.6 In other cases, medicine has moved away 
from a taxonomy grounded in tangible biological differences 
in favour of delineating diseases with reference to results 
of standard investigations – eg, the rejection of the old 
‘transmural’/’subendocardial’ classification of myocardial 
infarction (MI) for ST-elevation and non-ST-elevation MI, 
or the greater preference for the single diagnosis ‘chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease’ over ‘chronic bronchitis’ and 
‘emphysema.’ 
What does this tell us about the ‘biomedical image’ of 
the world? That it is – and only intends to be – a partial, 
perspectival, and pragmatic attempt to model things going 
on in the world, in ways that best serve the epistemic and 
practical objectives of physiological and medical practice – 
chief among these being prediction (of how intervening in a 
physiological system will alter its behavior, or clinically how a 
given condition may develop) and technological intervention 
(understanding what interventions might help people become 
healthier). Biomedical models of human experience are not 
complete descriptions of the territory – they are maps to help 
guide us through it. 
Mistaking the Map for the Territory 
This view of the biomedical image is at odds with one of the most 
pervasive critiques of both medicalization and overdiagnosis 
– the claim, endemic throughout the medicalization 
literature, that medicalization serves to individualise social 
problems, to “locate the sources and solution of these 
problems increasingly on the individual level.”1 For this to be 
a strict logical consequence of medicalisation alone would 
require that the biomedical description of a phenomenon is 
an exclusive one – taken to describe the ‘true’ nature of the 
thing, without remainder.7 If the above picture of biomedical 
models is correct, though, this is not the case. 
Even if not logically entailed by medicalisation, the nonlogical 
implications of the way medical institutions speak about 
conditions might serve this purpose. If in practice health 
workers overwhelmingly focus on the individual and 
biological (despite ostensibly acknowledge the significance of 
the social or political) then this might form an ‘ideology’8 that, 
combined with the socially privileged position of medical 
institutions, serves to exclude those other dimensions in 
practice from collective understanding[1].3 This however 
cannot be the whole story, since – as van Dijk et al themselves 
observe – health workers generally do not treat medicalization 
as excluding social understandings of a phenomenon. Indeed, 
they are often amongst the most vocal advocates for political 
action on supposedly medicalized issues.1 
If the mere fact of medicalization does not entail this 
individualization, we need to ask how medicalisation might 
be further exploited to produce this result. In other words, we 
must take up Ann Garry’s challenge to “disentangle a number 
of other social factors that play into the negative constructions 
that surround or at least accompany medicalisation: 
commercialization, risk management, …”10 – to determine 
what society does with medicine and the biomedical image of 
the world in order to achieve this result. To make this leap from 
medicalisation to biomedical reductionism requires reading a 
pragmatic model as the complete picture – mistaking the map 
for the territory. 
This mistake is practically demonstrated throughout the uses 
to which medical descriptions are put in different settings. As 
George Szmukler observes, diagnoses are hugely “overworked 
tools.”11 They are used, inter alia, to: determine eligibility to 
certain forms of state benefit; to evaluate insurance policies 
and claims; and to determine degree of criminal responsibility 
in the courts. If these diagnoses did represent the ‘territory’ 
– they completely and accurately described the lives and 
experiences of the people bearing them – then this might 
be legitimate without further argument. But if in fact the 
biomedical image is tailored to serving entirely different 
purposes – those of medical research and clinical practice 
– it gives no reason to believe it can usefully serve these 
additional functions, any more than a screwdriver can be used 
as a saw[2]. 
If, then, (as van Dijk et al suggest) diagnoses of ‘mild 
cognitive impairment’ or ‘mild learning disability’ drive 
institutionalization of people struggling to cope with the 
complexities of contemporary society –the “medicalized 
answer of a society that ultimately values economic efficiency 
over inclusiveness”1 – the source of this problem lies not 
with the medicalisation itself (since health workers explicitly 
acknowledge these diagnoses are culture-bound, defined in 
terms of function within a society and – in the case of LD 
– relativized to community statistical norms). The problem, 
rather, is with what society does with those descriptions 
– treating them as excluding other understandings and so 
licensing an exclusively medical engagement with the relevant 
problems. 
The same mechanic is played out repeatedly in many other 
controversial medicalisation cases. Given a basic assumption 
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of materialism, it should not be controversial to assert 
the importance of physiological processes to explain why 
some people misuse and become addicted to alcohol or 
other substances, or that intervention at a physiological or 
psychological level might help individuals struggling with 
addiction; the problem arises only when describing addiction 
as a physiological phenomenon is taken to entail that it is 
not a social phenomenon.12 In a rather different setting, 
patients with medically unexplained symptoms appear to 
seek from medical descriptions of their experience, not 
accurate predictions or successful treatment, but rather a 
legitimization of their suffering and removal of blame.13 Here 
medicalisation functions not to guide treatment but to “give 
something [social] acceptance and status.”14 There are useful 
medical descriptions of human pain that in many cases are 
of great benefit to people – but when these descriptions are 
taken to be the only legitimate ones, and medicine granted a 
monopoly on human suffering, then it is inevitable that people 
will seek to interpret their distress through a medicalized lens. 
Conclusion 
If what society does with medicine is to reify the biomedical 
image of the world in a way that inhibits political responses 
to social problems, how are those responsible for shaping 
the biomedical image to respond? Van Dijk et al describe a 
vicious cycle involving medical practitioners and institutions 
and the societies in which they are situated that drives 
increasing medicalisation and overdiagnosis; but recognition 
that this cycle depends upon mistaking the medical map for 
the human territory affords an opportunity to break it. Van 
Dijk et al suggest that an increasing medicalisation of human 
experience at the macro-level makes individual people more 
likely to interpret their own experiences in medicalized terms, 
and to seek medical remedies for it; the resulting expansion 
in rates of diagnosis raises the prominence of medical 
descriptions of the relevant dimensions of people’s lives, 
encouraging further medicalisation. This cycle is driven by 
the move from medicalisation to the interpretation of human 
experience overwhelmingly in medical terms; but if the above 
argument is correct, the latter is not an inevitable consequence 
of the former. To prevent this inference requires an increased 
individual and societal awareness of how the biomedical 
image of the world only provides a limited perspective upon 
it – one enormously valuable for serving certain purposes, 
but utterly unsuited to others. With this established, the 
medical lens becomes one amongst a range of complementary 
perspectives through which to view the world. 
A partial response to the harmful consequences of what 
society may do with medicine, then, involves humility on 
the part of medical professionals and institutions – a frank 
admission of the limitations of the biomedical image of the 
world, and an embrace of other images that are better able to 
serve other purposes, at least as important to individual and 
social flourishing.
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Endnotes 
[1] I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting the need to 
acknowledge the operations of epistemic and social privilege in this context. 
Unfortunately a more detailed exploration of these issues lies beyond the scope 
of this paper, but is a subject of much recent work on the subject of epistemic 
injustice and illness.9 
[2] An anonymous reviewer highlighted that these uses of diagnoses do not 
necessarily require the realist interpretation of medicalised descriptions of these 
phenomena; one may simply declare by fiat that eg, ‘if you have diagnosis x, 
you are entitled to benefit y.’ This is, of course, correct; my point concerns rather 
the justification of such policies. If saying that someone has diagnosis x is to 
say that they simply are a certain way, then one might be able to infer eg, what 
responsibilities the state has toward them, or what actions they should or should 
not be held criminally responsible for. But if their having diagnosis x is only to 
say that we can expect them to display certain biological (ir)regularities, and that 
certain treatments may have particular benefits for them, then it is illegitimate 
to infer without further argument that this should entail anything about their 
standing with regard to these separate social or political questions. 
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